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Abstract: This study empirically investigates what kinds of countries imported and exported medical 
products during the COVID-19 pandemic. To that end, we examine the bilateral trade values of medical 
products traded among 35 reporting countries and 250 partner countries between January and August in 
both 2019 and 2020. Specifically, we shed light on four kinds of bilateral linkages, including political ties 
(captured by voting similarity in the United Nations), economic ties (existence of regional trade 
agreements), demographic ties (numbers of migrants), and geographic ties (geographical distance). Our 
findings can be summarized as follows. An increase in COVID-19 burden leads to decreases in exports 
of medical products. However, such a decrease is smaller when exporting to countries with closer 
political, economic, or geographical ties. In contrast, demographic ties play a key role in the import of 
personal protective products. Immigrants receive face masks from relatives in their home country when 
the immigrant’s country of residence is strongly impacted by COVID-19. 
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1. Introduction 
     Many countries have experienced a shortage of medical products during the novel 
coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which the World Health Organization (WHO) 
recognized on 11 March 2020. Since that time, the demand for protective items, such as face 
masks, has risen dramatically worldwide. However, due to the limited supply, people were 
not able to obtain a sufficient number of items. Even hospitals were in danger of running 
out of masks. Furthermore, to ensure an adequate supply for domestic consumption, many 
countries imposed measures against the outflow of these items, including export bans. 
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license for this study. 
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According to the World Trade Organization 1 , China supplied 25% of the face masks 
exported to the world market in 2019, and together with Germany and the US, provided 
nearly half of the global supply. These three countries also had a large number of confirmed 
cases and consequently required a large number of masks. Thus, it proved challenging to 
import medical products from foreign countries. 
     This study empirically investigates what kinds of countries imported and exported 
medical products during the COVID-19 pandemic. As mentioned above, many countries 
that were in danger of running out of medical products restricted their exports abroad. 
Nevertheless, many of those countries allowed exports to certain “special” countries. For 
instance, owing to a longstanding or close relationship, they might help neighboring 
countries by exporting urgently needed products. In addition, they might export to 
countries with similar political stances. Medical products might also be imported from 
countries with large expatriate populations. Old colonial ties or close economic ties, 
including regional trade agreements (RTAs), might facilitate the trade of medical products. 
In short, countries may prohibit exports in general but engage in trade with some countries 
when there are specific reasons to do so. 
     Herein, we examine the bilateral trade values of medical products among 35 reporting 
countries and 250 partner countries between January and August in both 2019 and 2020. We 
follow the World Trade Organization (WTO) classification of medical products, which 
includes four categories: medicines, medical supplies, medical equipment, and personal 
protective products. We regress the trade values of each category on the numbers of COVID-
19 cases or deaths in exporting and importing countries. The coefficients for these numbers 
indicate the impacts of COVID-19 on trade in each category of medical products. Then, we 
introduce interaction terms for these numbers together with various bilateral measures to 
identify the “special” countries mentioned above. Following the literature on the 
determinants of foreign aid, we examine four measures: the similarity index in United 
Nations voting record (i.e., political ties), the RTA dummy (i.e., economic ties), the numbers 
of immigrants between exporting and importing countries (i.e., demographic ties), and 
geographical distance (geographic ties). By exploring the estimates in these interaction 
terms, we investigate what kinds of bilateral relationships increase trade in medical 
products. 
Indeed, investigating health diplomacy in the COVID-19 era provides a rare 
opportunity for evaluating the roles of bilateral relations.2 Fazal (2020) examines SARS 2003, 
                                                   
1 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/rese_03apr20_e.pdf 
2  The definition of health diplomacy is a topic of debate (Feldbaum and Michaud, 2010). Health 
diplomacy is different from global health diplomacy. The main aim of global health diplomacy is to 
contribute to the improvement of global health, whereas that of health diplomacy is to increase or 
strengthen national interests by solving the health problems of other countries (Bliss, 2011). According to 
Bliss, China and Russia are pioneers of health diplomacy based on their humanitarian, strategic, and 
ideological purposes. 
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HINI 2009, MERS 2012, and Ebola 2014 and 2018 as health diplomacy cases during a 
pandemic period. Yet, these cases were not global crises and thus did not have enough 
variations to examine the role of country-pair characteristics in health diplomacy. 
Furthermore, during such a crisis, multilateral approaches such as using international 
organizations tend not to work well because there is less coordination. Indeed, health 
diplomacy around COVID-19 has shown fragmentation (Fazal, 2020). Great powers like the 
US and China and emerging countries like Turkey and Taiwan have played the role of donor 
countries of medical products. Furthermore, competition between the US and China and the 
weak leadership of the WHO provided the conditions for bilateral health diplomacy. As a 
result, bilateral linkages are expected to play a more critical role in the international trade 
of medical products during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
     The findings of the regression analyses can be summarized as follows. An increase in 
the number of COVID-19 cases or deaths in a country significantly decreases the exports of 
medical products and increases their imports. However, such a decrease in exports becomes 
smaller when exporting to countries with political, economic, or geographical ties, whereas 
the increase of imports does not become larger when importing from such countries. In 
contrast, demographic ties play a role in the importation of medical products, especially 
personal protective products. Immigrants receive face masks from relatives in their home 
country when the immigrant’s country of residence is strongly impacted by COVID-19. In 
sum, our analyses suggest that medical products tend to be exported based on political or 
economic incentives, even when a country experiences increased impacts from COVID-19. 
In contrast, people-to-people networks play a key role in importing medical products. 
Our study is related to various strands of the literature, including a large number of 
studies on how and why countries grant foreign aid. Recent examples include Bermeo (2017) 
and Dreher et al. (2018). Although health diplomacy appears similar to foreign aid, in-kind 
aid may differ from monetary aid. Second, we contribute to the literature on the 
international trade–COVID-19 nexus. Some studies have empirically investigated the effects 
of COVID-19 on global value chains (Hayakawa and Mukunoki, 2020b; Friedt and Zhang, 
2020; Kejzar and Velic, 2020; Meier and Pinto, 2020). These studies show that the negative 
effects of COVID-19 on trade propagate across countries through supply chains. Some 
studies also discuss this trade–COVID-19 nexus in the context of medical products (Evenett, 
2020; Gereffi, 2020). There are also several policy reports on China’s “mask diplomacy.” 
Examples include ADB (2020), Baldwin and Freeman (2020), Kahn and Prin (2020), Verma 
(2020), White (2020), and Wong (2020). However, these studies do not statistically 
investigate the effects of COVID-19 on the trade of medical products and how those effects 
differ according to bilateral linkages. 
The studies closest to this paper are Fuchs et al. (2020) and Telias and Urdinez (2020). 
Both studies investigate exports of medical products from China and shed light on the roles 
of political and economic ties with foreign countries. We extend their analyses in terms of 
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the following three points. First, we cover worldwide trade, including exports from China. 
As mentioned above, our study potentially includes 250 exporter countries, and thus our 
analysis provides more general results. Indeed, due to the focus on China’s exports, the 
above studies examine factors specific to China, such as the One China Policy, which are not 
necessarily useful for deriving policy implications that are applicable to the rest of the world. 
Second, we examine not only economic and political linkages but also demographic linkages 
(i.e., migration). Third, we investigate the role of these linkages in both exporting and 
importing. The separation of these investigations is important because, as introduced above, 
each kind of linkage has different effects between exporting and importing. In short, our 
analysis presents richer results. 
     The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes our 
conceptual framework on the trade of medical products during the pandemic era by 
referring to the determinants of foreign aid policy. In Section 3, we present an overview of 
the global trade of medical products. After explaining our empirical framework in Section 
4, we report our estimation results in Section 5. Lastly, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Given the global nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, every country needs medical 
products. During a pandemic, the act of supplying medical products can be considered a 
form of foreign aid (Hattori, 2011). Indeed, as in the case of foreign aid, the aim of health 
diplomacy is to strengthen national interests (Vanderwagen, 2006; Feldbaum and Michaud, 
2010). Therefore, to elucidate the mechanism and motivation underlying the trade of 
medical products in the COVID-19 era, this section discusses some possible factors that have 
an influence on foreign aid from the viewpoint of international relations. 
Foreign aid can be characterized by three main pillars: strategic relationships, 
humanitarian behavior toward recipient countries, and economic assistance to recipient 
countries. The motivation behind strategic relationships is to obtain material benefits such 
as political and security gains. Humanitarian behavior is aimed at increasing soft power (i.e., 
intangible influence) in world politics. Although the motivation behind economic assistance 
is similar to that of humanitarian behavior, the former also intends to develop recipient 
states as future trading partners. McKinley and Little (1977) studied US foreign aid 
programs during the 1960s and concluded that strategic relationships were the central 
motivation of the programs.3 They also examined the aid policies of the UK, France, and 
                                                   
3  More specifically, McKinley and Little (1977) suggested five elements for comparative analysis: 
development interests, overseas economic interests, security interests, power-political interests, and 
interest in political stability and democracy. Security interests, power political interests, and interest in 
political stability and democracy are regarded as the motivation behind strategic relationships. 
Development interests are based on humanitarian behavior. The aim of overseas economic interests is to 
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Germany during the 1960s and clarified that the UK and France prioritized strategic 
relationships (McKinley, 1979; McKinley and Little, 1978). Meanwhile, these studies 
concluded that economic assistance and humanitarian action are not key drivers of donor 
countries’ motivation. 
Schraeder et al. (1998) added three more factors, including cultural/historical 
similarities, ideological stance, and geographical features. Although these models relate to 
the three traditional pillars, the motivations behind them are slightly different. For cultural 
similarities, decision-makers take account of cultural ties based on historical legacies such 
as colonial traditions, given that former colonies have similar social systems. For ideological 
ties, decision-makers prioritize ideological similarities when selecting the destination of aid. 
Geographical features may be linked with strategic relationships because geographical 
proximity is an element of threat perception for decision-makers, which is directly 
connected to national security (Walt, 1987). Decision-makers tend to tame neighboring 
countries through either military power or foreign aid. In some cases (e.g., wars, civil wars, 
or disasters), the geographic position can be critical. Neighboring states may need an 
emergent response to such cases for their security. In an analysis of four countries (the US, 
Japan, France, and Sweden) in the 1980s, Schraeder et al. (1998) found that all the six 
elements affected the donor’s motivation or the target of the aid. Nevertheless, they 
emphasized that humanitarian concerns are a relatively weak motivation for decision-
makers, whereas economic relationships via trade play a vital role in all donor countries’ 
motivation. 
Recent studies on foreign aid have introduced the idea of constructivism. One of the 
core ideas of constructivism is identity. Theories about international relations have included 
several kinds of identity, such as national identity and state identity (Wendt, 1999). Among 
them, national identity plays a decisive role in the sending and receiving of foreign aid. 
Shain and Aharon (2003) emphasize the diaspora (or broadly speaking, kinship) nexus 
between donor and recipient countries. The activities of Jewish and Armenian lobbies in the 
US are typical examples of diaspora politics. They have four motivations, namely, 
influencing (i) the whole kinship community, (ii) the future of their homeland, (iii) people 
or communities in their host country, and (iv) influential organizations, such as American-
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in the case of Jewish Americans (Shain and Aharon 
2003). Diaspora politics have worked well in the arena of foreign aid. 
Migrant communities also play a role similar to that of the diaspora mentioned above. 
For example, Bermeo and Leblang (2015) found a positive relationship between aid 
allocation and the number of migrants from a recipient country to a donor country. One 
motivation for donor countries to provide aid might be to decrease migration from the 
recipient country. However, migrants (those with dual-citizenship) living in a host country 
are interested in developing their home country. To this end, migrants or migrant 
                                                   
form alliances with trading partners. 
6 
organizations may pressure the government of the host country by joining forces with their 
home government. For example, they lobby the host government to provide aid to their 
home country (Prather, 2020). In sum, members of diaspora and migrant communities can 
play a key role in the decision-making of donor countries. 
In sum, as a model of foreign aid of donor countries, previous studies supposed seven 
factors: strategic relationships, humanitarian relations, economic partners, cultural 
similarities, ideological similarities, geographical features, and identity ties. Those studies 
concluded that humanitarian action is not a critical factor. Although ideology worked well 
during the Cold War era, it is no longer relevant. In addition, geographic proximity is critical 
to avoiding potential conflicts with neighboring countries. Hence, strategic relationships, 
economic partners, cultural ties (historical legacy), identity network, and geographic 
features, play critical roles in the allocation of foreign aid.  
These five factors may also have significant effects on the international trade of 
medical products in the COVID-19 pandemic. Health diplomacy during a pandemic can be 
considered a form of foreign aid. Moreover, many countries introduced export prohibitions 
and restrictions on the trade of medical products in order to mitigate shortages of those 
products and keep them for domestic use. For example, according to the WTO4, 73 countries 
or territories introduced such restrictions on face and eye protection as of 22 April 2020. 
Therefore, governments and other decision-makers have exerted some control over the 
trade of medical products. Therefore, the abovementioned factors in foreign aid are 




     This section presents an overview of the international trade of medical products 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. The rise in the number of confirmed cases led to a dramatic 
increase in the demand for certain key medical goods, including medical devices, protective 
equipment, and pharmaceuticals. Because this rise occurred at a similar timing in most 
countries, supplies of those goods rapidly dwindled in many countries. Indeed, the 
production of medical goods is concentrated in a limited number of countries, including 
China, Germany, Switzerland, and the US. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, 
many countries introduced export prohibitions and restrictions on those goods. Although 
most industries experienced a sharp drop in global trade in April and May 2020 (Hayakawa 
and Mukunoki, 2020a), the trade of medical products may show a different trend. 
Here, we examine the monthly trade values of medical products worldwide. We 
follow the classification of medical goods defined by the WTO. According to its website, 
there are four categories. The first is medicines (pharmaceuticals), including immunological 
                                                   
4 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/export_prohibitions_report_e.pdf 
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products, vaccines for human medicine, and medicaments. The second is medical supplies, 
which are consumables for hospital and laboratory use (e.g., alcohol, syringes, gauze, 
reagents). The third is medical equipment, which includes medical, surgical, and laboratory 
sterilizers as well as medical and surgical instruments and apparatuses. The fourth category 
is personal protective products (Personal), which includes hand soap and sanitizer, face 
masks, and protective eyewear. A list of six-digit level codes in the Harmonized System (HS) 
2017 is available on the WTO website.5  
We obtained the monthly data on trade values from the Global Trade Atlas maintained 
by the IHS Markit.6 In particular, we examine the trade values of the 35 countries listed in 
the Global Trade Atlas, that is, the 35 reporting countries in the database.7 The potential 
number of trading partner countries is 250. We aggregate the trade values at the HS six-digit 
level according to the four categories described above. We first examine the monthly exports 
of the 35 countries in 2020 relative to those in 2019. We focus on exports because the data on 
imports may indicate the figures one or two months after production. This time lag is 
inevitable because import statistics record the date of arrival at ports in importing countries, 
and it takes some time to ship goods from the port of an exporting country to the port of an 
importing country. This time lag may not matter much when using annual data but might 
affect the results of a month-by-month analysis such as ours (Hayakawa, 2020). Thus, when 
examining monthly trade values, we use only the trade data from export statistics. 
The exports of the 35 countries to the rest of the world for each category of medical 
products are shown in Figure 1. The increase in exports of personal protective products is 
of particular note. It rose dramatically in April, peaked in May, and then gradually 
decreased. In May, the magnitude of exports was 2.5 times larger than that in 2019. Even in 
August, it was still more than 50% greater. This dramatic increase is consistent with 
consumer demand. Face masks were needed for infection control not only at hospitals but 
also offices. Although the growth of exports in other medical goods is moderate compared 
with that in personal protective products, it is greater than the value of one, indicating a 
larger magnitude than the level in 2019. This fact is surprising because other products (e.g., 
apparel, electronic machinery products, and transport equipment) experienced a sharp drop 
in trade, particularly in April and May (Hayakawa and Mukunoki, 2020a). Thus, based on 
the rise in demand, the trade in medical goods increased despite the export restrictions 
imposed by many countries. 
 
                                                   
5  http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/nomenclature/covid_19/hs-
classification-reference_2_1-24_4_20_en.pdf?la=en. It should be noted that this list does not include 
intermediate products needed to produce these medical products because it is difficult to identify 
whether intermediate products are used for medical or non-medical products. 
6 https://connect.ihsmarkit.com/gta/home 
7 AR, AT, AU, BE, BR, CA, CH, CI, CN, DE, DK, ES, FR, GB, GR, HK, ID, IE, IL, JP, KE, KR, LU, MX, MY, 
NL, PH, PT, RU, SE, SG, TH, TW, US, ZA 
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===   Figure 1   === 
 
Next, we examine who exports or imports medical products by exploring the sum of 
exports to or imports from other countries from January to August in 2020. To this end, we 
mix the trade values of export and import statistics because this is not a month-by-month 
analysis. We create a more comprehensive dataset on global trade by using mirror trade 
data. We use imports when both exports and imports are available, that is, if both exporting 
and importing countries are “reporting countries” in the database. The top five exporters 
and importers are listed in Table 1. In terms of exports, Germany and the US are key players 
in most medical product categories. However, China is a major exporter of personal 
protective products, accounting for 45% of the world’s exports. Thus, the surge in exports 
of personal protective products shown in Figure 1 was realized mostly by China’s exports. 
However, in terms of imports, Germany and the US are again key players in most medical 
products. The US in particular ranked first in all four categories. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
 
4. Empirical Framework 
This section presents our empirical framework for investigating the impacts of 
COVID-19 on the international trade of medical products. We examine these impacts by 
exploring the sum of bilateral trade values from January to August for both 2019 and 2020. 
Our dataset contains two time points. As shown in Table 1, we use both import and export 
statistics to maximize the number of country pairs included in the dataset. As in the previous 
section, we use the data on trade values from the Global Trade Atlas. Thus, our dataset 
covers the trade between 35 reporting countries and 250 trading partners. We again 
aggregate trade values at the HS six-digit level according to the four categories of medical 
products. 
Our baseline model is as follows. 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp�𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦� ∙ 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the sum of export values from countries i to j during January-August in year y. 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the COVID-19 burdens in exporting countries and importing 
countries, respectively. We control for two kinds of fixed effects (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦). The subscript 
“f” indicates the trade flow included in the data (i.e., export statistics or import statistics). 
Given that our study time includes two points, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦  has four combinations. 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   is a 
disturbance term. We estimate this equation for each category of medical products by the 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) method. 
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We measure COVID-19 burden as the sum of the number of confirmed cases or deaths 
from January to August. These data are obtained from the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control8 and have been collected on a daily basis from reports issued by 
health authorities worldwide. The numbers are set to zero for 2019. We add a value of one 
to these numbers and then take their logs. Although these numbers represent those who 
contracted the virus, large numbers are also expected to have a substantial psychological 
impact on the uninfected, discouraging them from working or going out. Thus, we expect 
that this measure reflects the economic impacts of COVID-19. As a result, the coefficients 
for these numbers indicate the effects of COVID-19 on trade.  
We introduce two kinds of fixed effects. 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents country-pair fixed effects, 
which control for the standard gravity variables such as geographical distance. Furthermore, 
due to the short time period (two years), this type of fixed effect may control for country 
characteristics that do not change much in such a short time (e.g., the total population of 
importing and exporting countries). 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦  represents year-flow fixed effects. The year 
component of this indicator controls for changes in the world income, whereas the trade 
flow component (f) controls for the difference in the trade value between the import and 
export statistics, that is, the difference between FOB base values and CIF base values. 
Next, we extend our model by introducing the interaction terms of COVID-19 
variables with variables on various bilateral linkages. 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp�𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦� ∙ 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
(2) 
In Section 2, we have discussed the roles of political linkages (strategic relationships), 
economic linkages, demographic linkages (i.e., identity networks of migrants and diaspora), 
and geographical linkages in the relationships between donor and recipient countries in 
foreign aid. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  captures these four kinds of bilateral relationships between 
countries i and j.9 Furthermore, we examine the role of these linkages in exporting and 
importing separately by interacting these linkage variables with the COVID variables of 
importers and exporters. Some types of linkages may be effective only in the context of 
exporting and vice versa. 
     Here, we use the following variables to measure the strength of each linkage. In the 
literature, strategic relationships have been measured by several indicators, including 
treaties between donor and recipient countries, friend or foe status with respect to 
applicable states or alliances, and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting 
similarity (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). In the present study, as a political linkage measure, we 
use the voting similarity index in 2019, the data of which are obtained from Bailey et al. 
(2017). The index indicates the similarity of state preferences inferred from voting behavior 
in the UNGA. For the economic linkage, some studies examined the role of trade volumes 
                                                   
8 https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/covid-19-coronavirus-data 
9 Later, we also examine the role of cultural or historical linkages. 
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in foreign aid (Lundsgaarde et al., 2010). Instead of direct trade indicators, we use the 
dummy variable that indicates the existence of RTAs between the two countries. We obtain 
the RTA dummy variable from Egger and Larch (2008) and update it for 2020 by using the 
information on RTAs available on the WTO website. As an indicator of the demographic 
linkage, we use the number of migrants. Stock data on bilateral migrants as of 2019 are 
obtained from the report International Migrant Stock 2019 issued by the United Nations. We 
measure the geographical linkage by geographical distance, the data of which are drawn 
from the CEPII website.  
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
     This section reports our estimation results.10 In all estimations, we cluster the standard 
errors by country pairs. The estimation results of equation (1) are shown in Table 2. We 
report those by medical product categories and COVID-19 measures (i.e., cases and deaths). 
In all columns, the coefficient for the exporter’s COVID-19 is estimated to be negative, 
although the number of deaths is insignificant in terms of equipment trade. Thus, countries 
more severely impacted by COVID-19 decreased their exports of all medical products. The 
difference in magnitude across categories indicates that such a decrease in exports is 
relatively large for personal protection products and small for medical equipment. In 
contrast, the coefficient for the importer’s COVID-19 is significant only in terms of trade in 
personal protection products. Furthermore, the coefficient for the importer’s COVID-19 is 
estimated to be positive, indicating that countries with a larger number of cases or deaths 
increase their imports of personal protection products. This result is natural given that such 
countries need those products to prevent the further spread of infection. 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
Before estimating equation (2), we estimate our model for monthly trade to examine 
whether the effects of COVID-19 differ by month. To this end, we estimate the following 
equation: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐃𝐃′𝛂𝛂 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐃𝐃′𝛃𝛃+ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� ∙ 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (3) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the export value from countries i to j in month m in year y. To minimize the 
time lag between the production and the arrival of goods at ports, we only use the export 
statistics from reporting countries. For COVID variables, we use the sum of new cases and 
new deaths for each month.11 D includes dummy variables that indicate the month. We 
                                                   
10 The basic statistics are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
11 One notice is that the database reports 27 cases for China in December 31, 2019, which are added to 
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control for three kinds of fixed effects.  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  controls for not only the standard gravity 
variables but also the effects of trade agreements as well as the annual average of 
multilateral resistance terms in each country, the annual average of the exporter’s factor 
prices (e.g., wages), and the annual average of the importer’s income. 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is country-pair 
month fixed effects. This type of fixed effect controls for the seasonality of trade between 
the two countries (e.g., flu season). 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the year-month fixed effects, which control for 
time-series changes in world income. 
     The results are reported in Table 3. Compared with the results in Table 2, we can see 
many significant coefficients, implying that the significance of COVID-19 differs greatly by 
month. On the import side, a significant increase in personal protective products starts in 
April, perhaps because most countries recognized the threat posed by COVID-19 in March. 
On the export side, except for medicines, we can see negatively significant coefficients for 
most months. However, the absolute magnitude seems smaller in the third quarter (i.e., July 
and August), indicating that the shortage of those medical products started to be less severe 
because of the gradual decrease in confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths in Asia. In 
contrast, we do not find significant coefficients for exports of medicines in most months. 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
     Next, we start the estimation of equation (2). In Table 4, we interact with the similarity 
index in voting in the UNGA. The interaction terms for importers have significantly 
negative coefficients, except for trade in medicines. This result implies that countries tend 
to import those medical goods from countries with less similar state preferences. Thus, 
political linkages are not helpful when requesting medical aid. In contrast, the coefficient 
for the interaction term for exporters is significantly positive, especially for trade in personal 
protective products. Even if countries experience an increase in cases or deaths, they export 
personal protective products to countries with similar state preferences. Similar results can 
be found when introducing the interaction terms with the RTA dummy variable, as shown 
in Table 5. Countries are less likely to import medical products from RTA partners but more 
likely to export them to RTA partners. In sum, these results indicate that the decrease in 
exports of medical products caused by COVID-19 is smaller for exports to countries with 
political or economic ties. In other words, strategic and economic relationships play 
significant roles in the export of medical products but not in requesting medical aid. 
 
===   Tables 4 & 5   === 
 
    Next, we interact with the numbers of migrant stocks. The model becomes somewhat 
complicated because of the use of two unidirectional variables (i.e., trade and migration). 
                                                   
the cases for China in January 2020. 
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With COVID variables, we interact two migration variables, namely, the log of the number 
of migrants from an exporting country to an importing country (Emigration) and the log of 
the number of migrants from an importing country to an exporting country (Immigration). 
We name the migration variables based on the flow of trade and use the numbers as of 2019. 
We take their logs after adding the value of one because many country pairs have a zero-
valued stock of bilateral migrants.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 6. We can find significant results in 
interaction terms, especially for imports of personal protective products. In particular, the 
interaction term between the importer’s COVID and Emigration has significantly positive 
coefficients when using both the cases and deaths of COVID-19. This result implies that a 
country tends to import personal protective products from countries with large numbers of 
people immigrating to that country. In short, immigrants’ home countries send face masks. 
However, the negative result in the interaction term between the exporter’s deaths and 
Immigration is inconsistent with this result because both interaction terms capture the same 
flows in trade and migration. Nevertheless, in contrast to the results of political or economic 
ties, identity and demographic ties affect the import of essential goods.  
 
===   Table 6   === 
 
Table 7 shows the results when introducing the interaction terms with the log of 
geographical distance between two countries. The results are reported in Table 7 and show 
significant coefficients for the interaction terms for trade in most products. Those results 
indicate that when COVID-19 hits a country hard, that country does not necessarily import 
medical products from neighboring countries. This result might be because neighboring 
countries also want medical products when they experience a substantial increase in 
COVID-19 infections. However, the decrease of exports is smaller when exporting to 
neighbors. This result is similar to the cases of political and economic linkages presented in 
Tables 4 and 5. However, it is not limited to personal protective products but is found in 
most categories of products. Thus, geographical proximity plays a greater role in the export 
of medical products than other types of linkages, including political and economic relations. 
This result might also indicate that geographical connections are related to various linkages 
because it is natural that close political and economic ties would be established between 
neighboring countries. 
 
===   Table 7   === 
 
Lastly, we conduct two more analyses. First, to investigate the role of cultural or 
historical linkages, we introduce the interaction terms with the dummy for the past colonial 
ties, the data of which are obtained from the CEPII website, as in the case of geographical 
13 
distance. The estimation results are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. Most coefficients 
were estimated to be non-significant. We can see significant results mainly for trade in 
medical supplies in the case of deaths, which indicates that countries import those products 
from countries with past colonial ties but are less likely to export to such countries. Second, 
as found in Table 1, China is a key player in the trade of medical products. Thus, in Tables 
A3 to A6, we estimate our models by excluding China. Although the significance becomes 
weaker in the interaction term with RTAs, the other results do not change much. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This study empirically investigated what kinds of countries imported and exported 
medical products during the COVID-19 pandemic. To that end, we examined the bilateral 
trade values of medical products among 35 reporting countries and 250 partner countries 
between January and August in both 2019 and 2020. Our findings can be summarized as 
follows. An increase in COVID-19 burden led to decreases in exports of medical products. 
However, such a decrease is smaller when exporting to countries with political ties or 
economic ties or to neighboring countries. In contrast, demographic ties are critical in the 
import of medical products, especially personal protective products such as face masks. In 
sum, our analyses may indicate that medical products are likely to be exported based on 
political or economic incentives during the pandemic, whereas identity or demographic ties 
play a key role in the import of such products. 
These findings also contribute to the debate on foreign aid, including health 
diplomacy in international relations. Traditionally, strategic relationships and economic 
relations have been the most influential factors in foreign aid. However, our findings 
indicate that the decision-makers of donor states and migrants’ homelands also influence 
the demographic ties based on identity and geographic proximity during crises. During a 
global pandemic, it is crucial for decision-makers to explain to their people the need to 
prioritize domestic politics and national security because the public will demand that the 
crisis be addressed in their own country first. Clarifying their policy stance legitimizes 
sending essential goods such as medical products to other countries that are home to 
diaspora and migrant populations. Also, given that COVID-19 is a life-threatening disease, 
emigrants may engage more actively in demanding that medical products be sent to their 
home country. In addition, caring for neighboring countries is the first step toward 
preventing possible external threats, such as the entry of infected people. COVID-19 may 
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Table 1. Top 5 Exporters and Importers Between January and August in 2020 (%) 
Export
1st US 18 US 19 Germany 15 China 45
2nd Germany 15 Germany 12 Switzerland 12 Germany 9
3rd China 14 China 11 Ireland 12 US 7
4th Mexico 7 Ireland 5 US 9 Japan 4
5th Japan 6 Netherlands 5 Belgium 6 France 3
Import
1st US 21 US 16 US 21 US 12
2nd China 10 Germany 10 Germany 9 Germany 11
3rd Germany 7 Netherlands 6 Belgium 8 France 8
4th Netherlands 6 China 5 Switzerland 6 China 7
5th Japan 4 France 5 China 5 UK 5
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
 





Table 2. Baseline Results 
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
(i) Cases
Importer COVID 0.016 -0.011 -0.008 0.053**
[0.011] [0.010] [0.007] [0.023]
Exporter COVID -0.015** -0.031*** -0.024*** -0.052***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.012]
Log pseudolikelihood -2.5.E+09 -3.5.E+09 -8.5.E+09 -1.0.E+10
Pseudo R-squared 0.9953 0.9945 0.9962 0.9836
Number of obs 14,800 15,580 12,564 17,764
(ii) Deaths
Importer COVID 0.016 -0.01 -0.009 0.056**
[0.010] [0.008] [0.006] [0.024]
Exporter COVID -0.005 -0.027*** -0.018** -0.035***
[0.008] [0.005] [0.009] [0.011]
Log pseudolikelihood -2.5.E+09 -3.5.E+09 -8.5.E+09 -1.0.E+10
Pseudo R-squared 0.9953 0.9944 0.9962 0.9835
Number of obs 14,800 15,580 12,564 17,764  
Notes: This table reports the estimation results by the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country-pair fixed effects and trade 




Table 3. Monthly-level Estimation 
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
Importer COVID
   * 1 for January -0.007 -0.007 -0.033** 0.019 -0.031*** -0.017 -0.061** 0.021
   * 1 for February 0.012** 0.003 0.028** 0.024 0.000 0.016** 0.059*** 0.052*
   * 1 for March 0.009 0.012 0.042** -0.007 0.005 0.000 0.017 -0.017
   * 1 for April -0.019** -0.023 -0.007 0.051*** -0.016** -0.026** -0.011 0.024*
   * 1 for May -0.022 -0.001 0.017 0.066*** -0.017 -0.005 0.014 0.055***
   * 1 for June 0.012 0.012 -0.013 0.058*** 0.014** 0.012 -0.014 0.044***
   * 1 for July 0.011 -0.003 0.003 0.046*** 0.014 0.000 0.003 0.038***
   * 1 for August 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.057*** 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.050***
Exporter COVID
   * 1 for January -0.079*** -0.097*** -0.029* -0.171*** -0.135*** -0.153*** -0.095*** -0.276***
   * 1 for February -0.037*** -0.046*** 0.01 -0.092*** -0.047*** -0.057*** -0.024 -0.118***
   * 1 for March -0.004 0.001 -0.01 -0.018 -0.013 -0.003 -0.036 -0.063***
   * 1 for April -0.035*** -0.011 0.007 -0.087*** -0.021** -0.009 0.015 -0.042***
   * 1 for May -0.063*** -0.033*** -0.003 -0.122*** -0.053*** -0.026*** -0.009 -0.095***
   * 1 for June -0.037*** -0.050*** 0.017 -0.058*** -0.027*** -0.044*** 0.024* -0.043***
   * 1 for July -0.021* -0.038*** 0.013 -0.048*** -0.006 -0.033*** 0.01 -0.032**
   * 1 for August -0.023** -0.039*** 0.007 -0.033** -0.017* -0.029*** 0.005 -0.025
Log pseudolikelihood -2.6.E+09 -3.5.E+09 -1.4.E+10 -3.3.E+09 -2.6.E+09 -3.5.E+09 -1.4.E+10 -3.2.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9939 0.9938 0.9915 0.9943 0.9939 0.9938 0.9915 0.9945
Number of obs 59,352 65,560 52,226 70,884 59,318 65,522 52,206 70,856
Cases Deaths
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results by the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
The standard errors reported in parentheses are those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country-pair fixed effects and trade 





Table 4. Heterogenous Impacts: Political Linkages 
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
(i) Cases
Importer COVID 0.028* -0.011 -0.004 0.071**
[0.016] [0.010] [0.009] [0.032]
   * Agreement -0.017 -0.015* -0.013 -0.098***
[0.016] [0.009] [0.015] [0.029]
Exporter COVID -0.017** -0.034*** -0.028*** -0.124***
[0.009] [0.006] [0.009] [0.022]
   * Agreement 0.01 0.008 0.017 0.050*
[0.015] [0.009] [0.014] [0.025]
Log pseudolikelihood -2.3.E+09 -3.1.E+09 -8.1.E+09 -8.0.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9955 0.9948 0.9963 0.9864
Number of obs 12,914 13,702 11,414 15,376
(ii) Deaths
Importer COVID 0.026** -0.005 -0.005 0.089***
[0.012] [0.009] [0.008] [0.029]
   * Agreement -0.027*** -0.017* -0.009 -0.120***
[0.010] [0.008] [0.012] [0.028]
Exporter COVID -0.008 -0.027*** -0.023** -0.084***
[0.008] [0.005] [0.009] [0.021]
   * Agreement 0.018** 0.01 0.016 0.056**
[0.009] [0.007] [0.011] [0.023]
Log pseudolikelihood -2.3.E+09 -3.1.E+09 -8.1.E+09 -8.1.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9955 0.9948 0.9963 0.9861
Number of obs 12,914 13,702 11,414 15,376  
Notes: This table reports the estimation results by the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country-pair fixed effects and trade 
flow-year fixed effects. “COVID” indicates the number of confirmed cases (Cases) or deaths (Deaths). 
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Table 5. Heterogenous Impacts: Economic Linkages 
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
(i) Cases
Importer COVID 0.018* -0.006 -0.002 0.075***
[0.010] [0.008] [0.007] [0.019]
   * RTA -0.008 -0.029** -0.020* -0.082***
[0.015] [0.012] [0.011] [0.019]
Exporter COVID -0.017* -0.041*** -0.030*** -0.055***
[0.010] [0.007] [0.008] [0.017]
   * RTA 0.004 0.020* 0.022** 0.030*
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.016]
Log pseudolikelihood -2.5.E+09 -3.3.E+09 -8.4.E+09 -8.0.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9954 0.9947 0.9963 0.9872
Number of obs 14,800 15,580 12,564 17,764
(ii) Deaths
Importer COVID 0.022** -0.003 -0.004 0.094***
[0.010] [0.008] [0.007] [0.020]
   * RTA -0.016 -0.025** -0.011 -0.109***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.021]
Exporter COVID -0.008 -0.033*** -0.022*** -0.038**
[0.009] [0.006] [0.008] [0.018]
   * RTA 0.011 0.015* 0.014 0.034*
[0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.018]
Log pseudolikelihood -2.5.E+09 -3.4.E+09 -8.5.E+09 -7.8.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9953 0.9946 0.9962 0.9876
Number of obs 14,800 15,580 12,564 17,764  
Notes: This table reports the estimation results by the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country-pair fixed effects and trade 




Table 6. Heterogenous Impacts: Demographic Linkages 
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
Importer COVID 0.002 0.007 0.017 0.025 0.003 -0.006 0.009 0.019
[0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.017] [0.009] [0.010] [0.014] [0.019]
   * ln (1 + Immigration) 0.000 -0.002 -0.003* -0.008*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
   * ln (1 + Emigration) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.008***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
Exporter COVID -0.002 -0.041*** -0.040*** 0.015 0.012 -0.023* -0.017 0.048***
[0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.010] [0.012] [0.015] [0.017]
   * ln (1 + Immigration) -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002* -0.001 -0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
   * ln (1 + Emigration) 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.002** 0.003** 0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Log pseudolikelihood -2.3.E+09 -3.2.E+09 -8.4.E+09 -5.5.E+09 -2.3.E+09 -3.2.E+09 -8.5.E+09 -5.4.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9957 0.9949 0.9963 0.9912 0.9957 0.9949 0.9962 0.9915
Number of obs 14,800 15,580 12,564 17,764 14,800 15,580 12,564 17,764
Cases Deaths
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results by the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
The standard errors reported in parentheses are those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country-pair fixed effects and trade 




Table 7. Heterogenous Impacts: Geographical Linkages 
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
(i) Cases
Importer COVID -0.052 -0.140*** -0.114** -0.299***
[0.056] [0.051] [0.048] [0.071]
   * ln Distance 0.008 0.015*** 0.012** 0.040***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.009]
Exporter COVID 0.034 0.065 0.079 0.1
[0.046] [0.041] [0.049] [0.066]
   * ln Distance -0.006 -0.011** -0.012** -0.018**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008]
Log pseudolikelihood -2.5.E+09 -3.3.E+09 -8.4.E+09 -7.8.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9954 0.9946 0.9963 0.9876
Number of obs 14,800 15,580 12,564 17,764
(ii) Deaths
Importer COVID -0.058 -0.107*** -0.082* -0.283***
[0.042] [0.039] [0.046] [0.063]
   * ln Distance 0.009* 0.011*** 0.009 0.039***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.008]
Exporter COVID 0.046 0.046 0.062 0.055
[0.038] [0.032] [0.045] [0.054]
   * ln Distance -0.006 -0.008** -0.009* -0.009
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007]
Log pseudolikelihood -2.5.E+09 -3.4.E+09 -8.4.E+09 -7.9.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9953 0.9945 0.9962 0.9875
Number of obs 14,800 15,580 12,564 17,764  
Notes: This table reports the estimation results by the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country-pair fixed effects and trade 




Figure 1. Monthly Exports of Medical Goods in 2020 Relative to Those in 2019 
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Table A1. Basic Statistics 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Importer COVID 17,764 4.831 5.354 0 15.607
   * Agreement 15,376 1.538 3.718 0 15.607
   * RTA 17,764 1.821 4.025 0 15.607
   * ln (1 + Immigration) 17,764 20.851 40.611 0 253.719
   * ln (1 + Emigration) 17,764 21.020 39.033 0 223.430
   * ln Distance 17,764 41.926 46.864 0 151.808
   * Colony 17,764 0.125 1.037 0 12.118
Exporter COVID 17,764 5.047 5.498 0 15.607
   * Agreement 15,376 1.576 3.786 0 15.607
   * RTA 17,764 1.901 4.149 0 15.607
   * ln (1 + Immigration) 17,764 20.434 39.060 0 223.430
   * ln (1 + Emigration) 17,764 22.452 41.564 0 253.719
   * ln Distance 17,764 43.813 48.152 0 151.708
   * Colony 17,764 0.142 1.129 0 12.118  
Note: In this table, we compute the basic statistics for explanatory variables by using the observations for 





Table A2. Heterogenous Impacts: Colonial Linkages 
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
(i) Cases
Importer COVID 0.016 -0.012 -0.007 0.053**
[0.012] [0.010] [0.007] [0.023]
   * Colony -0.020* 0.015 -0.017 -0.028
[0.010] [0.011] [0.029] [0.028]
Exporter COVID -0.015** -0.031*** -0.025*** -0.051***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.009] [0.013]
   * Colony 0.015 -0.013 0.017 -0.001
[0.009] [0.009] [0.023] [0.023]
Log pseudolikelihood -2.5.E+09 -3.4.E+09 -8.5.E+09 -1.0.E+10
Pseudo R-squared 0.9953 0.9945 0.9962 0.9838
Number of obs 14,800 15,580 12,564 17,764
(ii) Deaths
Importer COVID 0.016 -0.011 -0.009 0.055**
[0.010] [0.009] [0.006] [0.024]
   * Colony -0.01 0.025** -0.014 -0.024
[0.015] [0.011] [0.029] [0.028]
Exporter COVID -0.004 -0.026*** -0.018** -0.034***
[0.008] [0.005] [0.009] [0.012]
   * Colony 0.002 -0.022** 0.013 -0.016
[0.012] [0.009] [0.021] [0.022]
Log pseudolikelihood -2.5.E+09 -3.5.E+09 -8.5.E+09 -1.0.E+10
Pseudo R-squared 0.9953 0.9944 0.9962 0.9837
Number of obs 14,800 15,580 12,564 17,764  
Notes: This table reports the estimation results by the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country-pair fixed effects and trade 




Table A3. Heterogenous Impacts by Political Linkages: Excluding China 
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
Importer COVID 0.028* -0.011 -0.004 0.017*
[0.016] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010]
   * Agreement -0.028** -0.011 -0.015 -0.037***
[0.012] [0.008] [0.015] [0.011]
Exporter COVID -0.004 -0.023*** -0.030*** -0.045***
[0.009] [0.005] [0.009] [0.012]
   * Agreement 0.023** 0.008 0.019 0.033***
[0.011] [0.008] [0.015] [0.010]
Log pseudolikelihood -1.3.E+09 -2.1.E+09 -7.6.E+09 -1.3.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9966 0.996 0.9963 0.9954
Number of obs 12,332 13,102 10,930 14,684  
Notes: This table reports the estimation results by the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country-pair fixed effects and trade 





Table A4. Heterogenous Impacts by Economic Linkages: Excluding China 
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
Importer COVID 0.016* -0.006 -0.004 0.003
[0.009] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
   * RTA 0.01 -0.012 -0.019* -0.015
[0.015] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011]
Exporter COVID -0.002 -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.039***
[0.010] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007]
   * RTA -0.008 0.007 0.020* 0.012
[0.011] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010]
Log pseudolikelihood -1.5.E+09 -2.3.E+09 -7.9.E+09 -1.5.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9964 0.9958 0.9963 0.9951
Number of obs 14,160 14,930 12,042 17,002  
Notes: This table reports the estimation results by the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate the1%, 5%, and 
10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in parentheses are those 
clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country-pair fixed effects and trade flow-




Table A5. Heterogenous Impacts by Demographic Linkages: Excluding China 
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
Importer COVID -0.006 0.018* 0.015 -0.018**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.007]
   * ln (1 + Immigration) 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
   * ln (1 + Emigration) 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Exporter COVID -0.008 -0.048*** -0.042*** -0.033***
[0.009] [0.012] [0.015] [0.008]
   * ln (1 + Immigration) 0.000 0.002** 0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
   * ln (1 + Emigration) 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Log pseudolikelihood -1.4.E+09 -2.3.E+09 -7.9.E+09 -1.5.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9966 0.9958 0.9963 0.9952
Number of obs 14,160 14,930 12,042 17,002  
Notes: This table reports the estimation results by the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country-pair fixed effects and trade 





Table A6. Heterogenous Impacts by Geographical Linkages: Excluding China 
Equipment Supplies Medicines Personal
Importer COVID 0.032 -0.075** -0.112** -0.130***
[0.049] [0.038] [0.049] [0.042]
   * ln Distance -0.001 0.008* 0.012** 0.015***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005]
Exporter COVID -0.011 0.03 0.073 0.084**
[0.035] [0.031] [0.051] [0.037]
   * ln Distance 0.001 -0.006* -0.012** -0.014***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005]
Log pseudolikelihood -1.5.E+09 -2.3.E+09 -7.9.E+09 -1.5.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9964 0.9958 0.9963 0.9952
Number of obs 14,160 14,930 12,042 17,002  
Notes: This table reports the estimation results by the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country-pair fixed effects and trade 
flow-year fixed effects. “COVID” indicates the number of confirmed cases (Cases) or deaths (Deaths). 
 
